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ABSTRACT 
This article discusses the ‘affair of the headscarf’ in France in 1989, its aftermath, the 
2004 enactment of a secularism law forbidding students to wear visible religious signs 
in public schools, and the 2010 adoption of a law prohibiting the wearing of the burqa.  
This article examines these events and community responses to the two laws in the 
context of organisational justice, which looks at individual perceptions of whether 
organisational change is morally right or fair, and considers whether organisational 
justice theories may help to explain aspects of the affair of the headscarf and the issues 
surrounding the burqa. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In late 1989, the first events of the ‘affair of the headscarf’ in France came to the attention of 
national and international media when three Muslim students were expelled from their public 
school in Creil, near Paris, for wearing (and refusing to remove) their Islamic headscarves.  
Their expulsion sparked further incidents in which more Muslim girls were suspended or 
expelled from schools around France, amid growing public protests which were widely 
reported in local and international media.  A number of schoolgirls appealed against their 
expulsions and, over the course of the 1990s and 2000s, French administrative courts heard 
the cases at first instance and the appeals from those decisions. 
 
Since those incidents, the French Parliament has passed two laws which impose restrictions 
on what Muslim girls and women may wear.  In 2004, the government signalled its intention 
to pass a so-called ‘law on secularism’ to forbid students from wearing in public schools 
‘signs or clothing by which students visibly manifest a religious affiliation’.  The law was 
intended to ban the wearing of the Islamic headscarf, although its broad scope extended the 
prohibition to other visible religious signs in public schools.  The proposed law prompted a 
surge of protests by Muslims living in many cities across France, and indeed in other 
countries1 (Le Monde, 2004; Dufour, 2004; Henley, 2004a; The Guardian, 2004).  It also 
provoked protests by members of other religious groups who were concerned about being 
caught up in the ban. 
 
Although the public protests subsided over the following years, the debate over religious 
clothing had not finished.  In 2010, the French Parliament enacted a law to prohibit the 
wearing of clothing which would conceal a person’s face in public places—in effect, 
legislation prohibiting the wearing of a burqa.  The law attracted considerable international 
attention—and support.  Indeed, France is not the only country to consider such a law: the 
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1 In January 2004, tens of thousands of Muslims marched in protest against the proposed law on secularism in 
Paris, Marseille, Lille and other cities across France, while other protests were held in London, Berlin, 
Stockholm, Brussels, Cairo and Bethlehem. 
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Belgian government enacted similar legislation in 2010, while legislatures in the United 
Kingdom, Italy, Holland, Spain, Germany, Norway, Denmark, Austria and Switzerland have 
also debated the adoption of laws banning the wearing of the burqa. 
 
Despite their different scope and subject matter, the 2004 law and the 2010 law have both 
been the subject of considerable public debate and controversy in France.  This article will 
discuss the two laws in the context of organisational justice, which looks at individual 
perceptions of and reactions to whether organisational change is morally right or fair.  The 
article will consider two principal components of organisational justice: procedural justice 
and distributive justice.  Procedural justice is concerned with the fairness of the procedures 
which are followed when decisions are made.  Distributive justice involves notions of fairness 
or equity in relation to the outcomes of decision-making or the distribution of resources 
(whether tangible, such as money, or intangible, such as power).   
 
In view of these theories, it is important to note individual and community perceptions of and 
responses to the two laws in order to appreciate fully their effects and implications.  What 
have been the responses of French people to the new laws?  Have the reactions of the Muslim 
community been different?  How have Muslim women responded?  And how do they feel 
about another law telling them what not to wear?  Organisational justice theories may offer 
some clues to understanding the responses of the Muslim and the broader French 
communities at the time the legislation was passed, and how these communities are likely to 
respond in the years to come. 
 
THE ‘AFFAIR OF THE HEADSCARF’ 
Events of the Affair 
In September 1989, at the start of the new school year, three Muslim schoolgirls wearing 
Islamic headscarves to classes at their school in Creil, north of Paris, were asked to remove 
their headscarves while at school.  The girls refused, whereupon the school principal and 
teachers interpreted this refusal as an attack on secularism in public education and 
immediately suspended them. 
 
This confrontation attracted widespread media attention and over the following weeks there 
was heated debate in national newspapers over the principle of secularism and the girls’ rights 
to education and freedom of religion.  By late October, newspapers were reporting similar 
incidents taking place in other cities across France (Gaspard & Khosrokhavar, 1995: 14-15).  
Muslim schoolgirls in Montpellier (France-Soir, 1989), Marseille (Chikha, 1990: 1; Le Point, 
1989), Avignon (Chikha, 1990: 2) and Lille (Glasberg, Albinet & Wenz-Dumas, 1989), some 
of whom had been wearing their headscarves for months and even years previous to this, were 
finding themselves suspended or expelled from their schools (Chikha, 1990: 2). 
 
On 4 November 1989, Education Minister Lionel Jospin sought the opinion of the Conseil 
d’État, France’s highest administrative court whose function is to advise the government on 
legislative and administrative matters, on whether ‘the wearing of signs of affiliation to a 
religious community is or is not compatible with the principle of secularism.’  After 
deliberating for three weeks, the Conseil d’État handed down its opinion.  On the basis of a 
number of constitutional and statutory texts in French and international law, the court 
concluded that in schools, the wearing by students of signs by which they wish to manifest 
their affiliation to a religion is not by itself incompatible with the principle of secularism, 
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insofar as it constitutes the exercise of freedom of expression and freedom of manifestation of 
religious beliefs […]. (Conseil d’État, 1989) 
 
In practice, this meant that wearing ‘signs of religious affiliation’ such as the Islamic 
headscarf in secular public schools was not incompatible with the principles of secularism or 
secular public education, and could not by itself result in a student’s suspension or expulsion.  
However, the Conseil d’État noted that the students’ rights to freedom of expression and 
freedom of religion could be limited if the religious signs which they wore would constitute 
an act of pressure, provocation, proselytism or propaganda, would jeopardise the dignity or 
freedom of the student or of other members of the school community, would compromise 
their health or their safety, would disrupt the progress of teaching activities and the 
educational role of teachers, and finally, would disturb order in the school or the normal 
operation of the public service. (Conseil d’État, 1989) 
 
Thus, in addition to recognising students’ rights, the Conseil d’État also acknowledged that 
students had certain responsibilities and obligations: to participate in classes and not to 
jeopardise health and safety, disrupt teaching activities or disturb order in the school. 
 
The Conseil d’État’s opinion effectively established certain principles, confirming that 
secularism was to be understood in conjunction with other values (such as freedom of 
expression and freedom of religion) but also indicating that both secularism and freedom of 
religion could be legitimately restricted when the observance of one started to interfere with 
observance of the other.  In practice, respect for both values was to be a balancing act, and 
establishing the balance was to prove one of the most contentious problems of the affair of the 
headscarf. 
 
A number of the schoolgirls and their families brought legal action in France’s administrative 
courts appealing against the expulsion decisions.  In the majority (around 83%) of the cases, 
the schoolgirls’ expulsions were overturned by the administrative courts, while in 
approximately 15% of the cases, their expulsions were upheld.   
 
A relatively consistent set of principles emerged from the ‘headscarf’ case law.  Although the 
Conseil d’État had consistently maintained that wearing the headscarf was not by itself 
sufficient reason to expel a student, this principle did not apply where the student engaged in 
certain activities or behaviours.  So, for example, a student’s expulsion could be justified if 
the student had engaged in political acts or activism (including attempting to pressure or 
proselytise to other students), had disturbed public order in the school by distributing 
brochures, or circulating petitions to other students or participating in protests, or had 
breached her obligations to attend all compulsory classes or to obey a teacher’s instructions.  
Such acts brought political or public interests within the school arena and as such were 
incompatible with secularism in public education. 
 
Symbolic Meanings of the Headscarf 
There were many reasons for the conflicts and controversy over the wearing of the Islamic 
headscarf.  For one thing, the affair of the headscarf struck a number of cultural, social and 
political ‘nerves’.  In 1989, Education Minister Jospin noted some of these factors: the 
emergence of ‘a powerful anti-Arab feeling’ stemming from the Algerian war of 
independence; the controversial issue of immigration; socio-economic problems such as high 
unemployment and inadequate housing experienced by many Muslim people; and, finally, 
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‘the question of French national identity and the place that foreigners can have in it’. 
According to Jospin, the fact that the French community ‘could become so inflamed about 
[the affair of the headscarf was] most certainly a sign of unease’ about issues such as these 
(1996: 76-7). 
 
Another reason was the headscarf itself, an item of clothing which has historically been a 
potent symbol with powerful, complex and sometimes contradictory political, religious, 
cultural and social connotations.  At times, the headscarf functioned—and was used—as a 
form of propaganda, sending a particular message and representing extremes of religious 
fundamentalism and even political terrorism.  In 1994, for example, there was reported to be 
widespread public support for a ban on the headscarf in schools on the basis that it was 
‘necessary’ and that it ‘sent a message to overly strident Muslim groups’.  According to one 
political commentator, ‘[t]his expulsion tactic was a spectacular means of showing the Arab 
community [France’s] muscles’ (Waxman, 1995).  The events of the affair also provided 
opportunities for conservative political parties such as the right-wing National Front to take a 
strong stand on social policies such as immigration, integration and assimilation, as well as 
offering a context for the expression of racist and anti-religious sentiments. 
 
To many French people, the headscarf appeared to signify the Muslim girls’ refusal to 
become French (DeBula Baines, 1996: 311).  Newspaper reports quoted admonitions by 
various citizens: ‘[These young girls] are in France, they must follow the customs of the 
country’ and ‘in France, [Muslims] must adapt to our habits, or else return to their own 
country’ (France-Soir, 1989).  Of course, one of the difficulties was that many of the 
schoolgirls had been born or had grown up in France—so they were in their own country.  
Another irony of the situation was that Muslim girls, who generally performed better at 
school than their male counterparts and were more likely to find work afterwards, had tended 
to be regarded as ‘the most capable of integrating’ (Le Quotidien de Paris, 1989). 
 
Perhaps the most important factor in the affair of the headscarf was the fundamental role of 
secularism in France.  The principle of secularism is a central tenet of French public policy, 
and public education in particular.  Secularism also represents a set of social and cultural 
values which have profound historical resonances for many French people.  In this context, 
many non-Muslim citizens believed that wearing the headscarf posed an unacceptable 
challenge to the fundamental Republican principle of secularism in public schools. 
 
2004 LAW: SECULARISM AND VISIBLE RELIGIOUS SIGNS 
In 2003, government agencies hosted a number of events to consider the question of 
secularism or, more specifically, the Islamic headscarf in public schools.  A one-day Round 
Table, attended by the media, government ministers (including then-Education Minister Luc 
Ferry), academics, education authorities, student representatives and experts on questions of 
integration, was organised on 22 May 2003 to focus on ‘Schools and Secularism today’ 
(Assemblée Nationale: Commission des Affaires Culturelles, Familiales et Sociales, 2003).  
The French national human rights commission interviewed various intellectuals and experts 
during October and December 2003, before producing an interim report entitled ‘Secularism 
today’ (Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l’Homme, 2003). 
 
Perhaps the best-known of these groups was the Commission to Consider the Application of 
the Principle of Secularism in the Republic, appointed by President Jacques Chirac in July 
2003 and headed by Bernard Stasi, Ombudsman for the Republic and a former French and 
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European parliamentarian.  Over six months, the commission interviewed many members of 
the community during more than 100 public hearings across the country and stimulated 
widespread debate on ‘the question of secularism’ before handing down its report in 
December 2003.  The Commission recommended that a secularism law be drafted to include 
the following provision: ‘In respect for freedom of belief and for the particular nature of 
private schools, clothing and signs manifesting a political or religious affiliation shall be 
prohibited in primary and secondary public schools’ (Commission de réflexion sur 
l’application du principe de laïcité dans la République, 2003: 58). 
 
The prohibition would apply to ‘visible signs, such as large crosses, headscarves, or kippas 
[Jewish skull caps]’ but not to smaller ‘discreet signs’ such as medallions or pendants 
consisting of small crosses, stars of David, Hands of Fatima or miniature Qur’ans 
(Commission de réflexion sur l’application du principe de laïcité dans la République, 2003: 
58-9).  This signalled a clear intention that the new law would apply to all religious signs, in 
contrast with previous conflicts which had in practice overwhelmingly concentrated on the 
Islamic headscarf. 
 
In March 2004, the law on secularism, entitled ‘Law concerning the application of the 
principle of secularism, the wearing of signs or clothing manifesting a religious affiliation in 
public schools, lower secondary and secondary schools’, was passed.  It inserted the following 
provision into the Code of Education: ‘In primary, lower secondary and secondary public 
schools, the wearing of signs or clothing by which students visibly manifest a religious 
affiliation is forbidden [...]’ (Law No. 2004-228: Art. 1). 
 
In accordance with the Stasi Commission’s report, this meant that Islamic headscarves, 
Jewish skullcaps and visible Christian crosses would be prohibited in public schools.  
Thenceforth, students wearing these signs risked suspension and even expulsion.  Indeed, the 
law appeared to extend further, prompting concern among many Sikh students that it would 
prevent them from wearing their turbans (Henley, 2004c).  Education Minister Ferry fuelled 
their concern by speculating that beards or bandanas worn by students might also be 
prohibited if they appeared to be religious: ‘As soon as anything becomes a religious sign, it 
will fall under this law’ (Henley, 2004b). 
 
Despite the vigorous protests, the affair of the headscarf and the profound social and political 
fragmentation which it catalysed appeared to subside in 2005.  However, the debate over 
religious clothing in France was not finished. 
 
2010 LAW: CLOTHING CONCEALING THE FACE 
In 2009, President Nicolas Sarkozy gave a speech to Parliament in which he announced that 
the full-face or full-body veil, also known as the burqa or niqab, was not welcome in France, 
and that a parliamentary commission would examine the practice of wearing the burqa in 
France.  The commission reported back to the National Assembly in January 2010 and made a 
number of recommendations.  The first of these stated that the burqa should be condemned as 
contrary to Republican values and that discrimination and violence against women should 
also be condemned.  Others recommended that immigration and refugee laws should be 
amended to require would-be citizens and refugees to accept values such as equality of the 
sexes and the principle of secularism and to allow religious fundamentalists to be refused 
residency status and citizenship.  Recommendation 13 advocated the adoption of a law which 
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would prohibit the hiding of one’s face in public places (Assemblée Nationale: Mission 
d’information sur la pratique du port du voile intégral sur le territoire national, 2010: 123-85). 
 
In September 2010, the Parliament passed a law prohibiting the wearing of clothing which 
would conceal a person’s face in public places.  Any breaches of the law could attract a 
maximum fine of 150 euros, or an order to attend citizenship classes, or both.  The law also 
prohibited anyone from forcing another person to conceal the face, on penalty of one year’s 
imprisonment and a 30,000 euro fine.  Both penalties were to be doubled if the person so 
constrained was a minor. 
 
DIFFERENT CLOTHING AND DIFFERENT LAWS 
It is important to note a fundamental distinction between the headscarf and the burqa: they are 
different items of clothing which aroused quite different sentiments—and concerns—in the 
broader community when they were worn.  The two laws enacted to restrict them were also 
different in their content and scope: the 2004 law prohibited public school students from 
wearing religious signs at school, while the 2010 law applied more broadly to people in public 
places. 
 
There were some similarities between the laws: both were controversial, prompting vigorous 
and widespread public protests in France and other countries when they were passed.  Both 
laws focused on clothing, which invited some practical questions, particularly in relation to 
the headscarf, of how to identify a religious sign as opposed to an item of clothing with no 
religious significance.  Further questions might also have been asked regarding where the 
limits of such legislation might be found, and how were such laws to be monitored or 
enforced?   
 
Perhaps the most obvious common element to the laws was in relation to the group of people 
most heavily affected or likely to be affected: in practice, both laws restricted the choices of 
clothing available to Muslim women and girls. 
 
IMPACTS OF THE LAWS 
Before the enactment of the 2004 law banning the wearing of visible religious signs, one 
cause for concern for many Muslims was that the Islamic headscarf appeared to be the only 
religious sign considered incompatible with secularism in French public schools.  Muslim 
schoolgirls felt unfairly targeted by a ban that seemed to apply only to them rather than to 
other students.  As one father commented in 1989: ‘Here in France people dress the way they 
want.  Why not my daughters?’ (Le Parisien, 1989). 
 
The passage of the legislation radically changed the legal regime which had hitherto governed 
the wearing of headscarves in school.  Indeed, in 2004, some newspapers reported that the law 
might have created more headscarf wearers than it discouraged.  Many Muslims felt 
‘stigmatised’ by the ban on religious signs (Henley, 2004b), while some girls expressed 
resentment at the government’s headscarf ban, particularly since one of the reasons was 
ostensibly to prevent their families from imposing it: ‘[b]ecause of this law, people will put on 
a headscarf just out of defiance’ (Walter, 2004; Duval Smith, 2004). 
 
Certainly, the headscarf was more visible than some other religious signs which can be worn 
underneath clothing, such as a Christian cross or crucifix or a Jewish Star of David.  Rather, 
the headscarf is in effect part of a person’s clothing.  However, on at least several occasions, 
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members of the Jewish community had been openly reassured that Jewish students wearing 
the kippa, or skullcap—an item of clothing worn on the head and arguably comparable to a 
headscarf—would not be suspended or expelled from their schools (Le Tourneau, 1997: 294; 
Bernard, 1994; Tincq, 1994). 
 
At the same time, the public comments and criticism directed at students wearing the Islamic 
headscarf also attracted some sympathy from non-Muslim students.  When one Avignon 
schoolgirl was suspended for wearing the headscarf, her classmates showed their solidarity by 
coming to classes also wearing headscarves (Seignoret, 1989). 
 
Although the broad overall purpose of the 2004 law was to expunge religious influences from 
public school precincts, the ban did not meet with the same level of protests from Jewish and 
Sikh students.  This may have been because they did not appear to share the same compulsion 
to wear their religious signs to school as Muslim students, or simply because they were fewer 
in number.   
 
However, a primary purpose of the 2004 law was to prevent students from wearing the 
headscarf and, for Muslim schoolgirls, this represented a radical change to the legal regime 
which had hitherto governed the wearing of headscarves in school.  Where previously the 
French administrative courts had found that Muslim schoolgirls were permitted to wear the 
headscarves but were prohibited from political or proselytising activities or disturbing public 
order or classes, the 2004 law on secularism imposed a straightforward ban on wearing visible 
religious signs, with no further qualification. 
 
The 2010 law prohibiting the burqa has an even greater and more disproportionate impact on 
Muslim women, who are virtually the only people likely to wear a burqa. 
 
ORGANISATIONAL JUSTICE AND PERCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS 
In view of the different effects of the two laws on many Muslim and non-Muslim 
communities in France, there are several ways in which organisational justice theories may 
contribute to a general understanding of the affair of the headscarf and the issues surrounding 
the burqa. 
 
Organisational justice theories concern individual perceptions of and responses to 
organisational change and a person’s belief that the changes are morally right or fair.  Making 
decisions—in this case, enacting the 2004 and 2010 laws—in accordance with organisational 
justice considerations would require a decision-maker to follow fair procedures and adhere to 
notions of fairness or equity in relation to the outcome of a decision or the distribution of 
resources. 
 
This article considers the effect of the 2004 and 2010 laws in the context of two principal 
components of organisational justice: procedural justice and distributive justice.  Procedural 
justice, which is concerned with the fairness of procedures followed when a decision is made, 
is noted only briefly, because there was no reason to consider that fair procedures were not 
followed when either law was passed.  Indeed, the governments of the time went to great 
lengths to undertake, or at least to appear to undertake, extensive public consultation and 
communication.  The number of committees formed and reviews, reports and private bills 
drafted to consider issues related to secularism in the modern French Republic, including the 
wearing of the headscarf and the burqa, reflects an extraordinary level of government and 
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community preoccupation with secularism over the past decade.  Although this may not have 
convinced all Muslim citizens that the governments of the time were following fair procedure 
as they moved towards enacting the 2004 and 2010 laws, the public nature of the consultation 
and committee work was nonetheless an open acknowledgement that the governments were 
taking the enactment of the laws very seriously. 
 
The other limb of organisational justice is distributive justice, which concerns perceptions of 
fairness or equity in relation to the outcomes of decision-making or the distribution of 
resources.  This aspect raises interesting questions because there appeared to be a strong 
community perception that the 2004 and 2010 laws did not have fair or equitable outcomes.  
Although the governments of the time would hardly have been surprised that the laws would 
disproportionately affect non-Muslim and Muslim citizens, they should have allayed or at 
least addressed the widespread perceptions of inequity should have been allayed.  On each 
occasion, they needed to communicate the content and implications of each law with 
considerable sensitivity at the time the law was enacted. 
 
In some cases, in the earlier years of the affair of the headscarf, good communication and 
dialogue between school authorities and the Muslim schoolgirls and their families helped to 
resolve the conflicts.  However, for some families, their attempts to resolve their daughters’ 
matters were further complicated by being at a linguistic disadvantage: they were unable to 
express themselves well in French and encountered difficulties making themselves understood 
by the school authorities (Glasberg, Albinet & Wenz-Dumas, 1989). 
 
The communication problems were compounded by socio-economic factors which also 
hampered attempts to discuss the issues or negotiate a compromise.  Many of the families 
were working class or poor, often living in crowded conditions on housing commission 
estates on the outskirts of major cities.  As a result, they were at a relative disadvantage in 
attempting to resolve disputes.  One father in Lille explained that the principal of his 
daughter’s school had told him that he must come to the school to discuss the matter, 
otherwise his daughter would be expelled: ‘As a result, on Monday I wasn’t able to go to 
work.  I am a builder.  And in a temping agency, missing a day of work means losing your 
job’ (Glasberg, Albinet & Wenz-Dumas, 1989). 
 
Stories such as these highlight the circumstances of relative disadvantage experienced by 
many Muslim schoolgirls and women and their families.  They also raise broad questions of 
whether the government’s failure to ensure equitable distribution of available resources such 
as employment, housing and health among French Muslim communities may explain some of 
the responses to the laws.  In circumstances such as these, perceptions of equity and fairness 
by Muslim women and girls, as well as by other members of the Muslim community, would 
arguably influence—and perhaps even determine—whether and how they accepted the 
outcomes of the laws. 
 
Research on distributive justice and organisational justice more broadly may help to explain 
why it was important for the French government to communicate—particularly to Muslim 
citizens and communities—how and why the 2004 and 2010 laws were passed.  Studies of 
employee attitudes reveal that employees’ perceptions of fairness in the workplace can affect 
the extent to which they accept and adjust to organisational change.  These perceptions can be 
influenced by factors based on communication and involvement, which help them to 
understand the reasons for the change and to make sense of their new environment.  In turn, 
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this process can prompt the employees to sustain their commitment and loyalty to the 
organisation (Baldwin, 2006: 10).   
 
Interestingly, interpersonal aspects of procedural justice may also be important in shaping 
perceptions of procedural justice.  Research into organisational justice trends suggests that 
people’s perceptions are influenced by factors other than whether fair procedure has been 
followed; rather, people will value interpersonal elements, such as the way they are treated by 
decision-makers, and will consider such treatment to be a determinant of fairness.  In other 
words, if people are treated with honesty and courtesy, shown respect for their rights, if they 
are given timely feedback and justifications or explanations for actions, these factors will play 
an important role in those people’s assessments of whether they have been fairly treated, 
regardless of the actual outcomes of their treatment (Greenberg, 1990: 411). 
 
If these principles are applied to a community environment, in which the government may be 
assumed to represent the employer organisation and the individual citizens the employees, 
then it seems clear that the French government must ensure that it communicates frequently 
and effectively with its Muslim citizens and that it also involves them in its decision-making 
processes.  This might require the government to explain to Muslim people and communities 
the objectives, progress and effects of its decisions, allow them to express their views and 
concerns, take these views and concerns seriously and act upon their suggestions.  Clearly, the 
governments of the time took some of these steps when they enacted the 2004 and 2010 laws. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This, then, is the challenge for modern secularism in contemporary France.  It is clear from 
events in France over the past two decades that secularism is still considered by many French 
people to be a fundamental element of their culture and law.  Equally clearly, the affair of the 
headscarf and the events surrounding the burqa signals that there are still fundamental 
questions to be asked about the nature of secularism and how it is to be lived in modern 
French society.  Such questions were unthought and indeed unthinkable when secularism was 
formally enshrined in legislation more than 100 years ago, but they are ones to which the 
French government—representing at once the Republic and the people themselves—must 
respond.   
 
Even more importantly, the government must work to ensure that the French people, and 
perhaps especially Muslim citizens, understand and accept decisions such as the enactment of 
laws regulating the headscarf and the burqa, for such community understanding and 
acceptance will determine the strength and stability of the government, as well as the 
relevance and future of secularism in the modern French Republic. 
 
REFERENCES 
Assemblée Nationale: Commission des Affaires Culturelles, Familiales et Sociales 2003, 
École et laïcité aujourd’hui. 
 
Assemblée Nationale: Mission d’information sur la pratique du port du voile intégral sur le 
territoire national 2010, Rapport d’information fait en application de l’article 145 du 
Règlement, No. 2262. 
 
Baldwin, S 2006, Organisational Justice, Institute for Employment Studies, UK. 
 
International Journal of Organisational Behaviour  Volume 17 (2) 
 
 
27 
Bernard, P 1994, Marceau Long s’interroge sur la validité de la circulaire Bayrou à propos du 
foulard islamique, Le Monde, 20 September. 
 
Chikha, E 1990, Chronologie. Hommes et Migrations, No. 1129-30. 
 
Commission de réflexion sur l’application du principe de laïcité dans la République 2003, 
Rapport au Président de la République. 
 
Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l’Homme 2003, La laïcité aujourd’hui. 
 
Conseil d’État (Assemblée générale) 1989, Port de signe d’appartenance à une communauté 
religieuse (foulard islamique), No. 346893. 
 
DeBula Baines, C 1996, L’Affaire des Foulards – Discrimination or the Price of a Secular 
Public Education System? Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 29, 303-327. 
 
Dufour, J 2004, Forte mobilisation à Lille, Le Monde, 19 January. 
 
Duval Smith, A 2004, France divided as headscarf ban is set to become law, The Observer, 1 
February. 
 
France-Soir 1989, Et vous, qu’en pensez-vous? 21 October. 
 
Gaspard, F & Khosrokhavar, F 1995, Le Foulard et la République. Paris, France: Éditions La 
Découverte. 
 
Glasberg, M, Albinet, V & Wenz-Dumas, F 1989, Le choc de l’Islam sur l’école de la 
République, Libération, 21 October. 
 
Greenberg, J 1990, ‘Organisational Justice: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow’, Journal of 
Management, 16(2), 399-432. 
 
Henley, J 2004a, ‘French MPs reappraise plan to outlaw veils’, The Guardian, 20 January. 
 
Henley, J 2004b, ‘Veil ban may extend to “religious” beards’, The Guardian, 21 January. 
 
Henley, J 2004c, ‘French Sikhs threaten to leave country’, The Guardian, 23 January. 
 
Jospin, L 1996, ‘Now or never’, in A Corbett & B Moon (eds.), Education in France: 
Continuity and Change in the Mitterand Years 1981-1995, 61-80. London, UK/New York, 
USA: Routledge. 
 
Law No. 2004-228 of 15 March 2004 (France), JO, 17 March 2004, 5190. 
 
Law No. 2010-1192 of 11 October 2010 (France), JO, 12 October 2010, 18344. 
 
Le Monde 2004, Mobilisation contre le projet de loi sur la laïcité. 17 January. 
 
Le Parisien 1989, Le voile est une tradition dans notre famille. 21 October. 
N Jones  Justice must be seen to be done: organisational justice 
and the headscarf and burqa laws in France 
 
28 
 
Le Point 1989, Faut-il laisser entrer l’Islam à l’école? 16 October. 
 
Le Quotidien de Paris 1989, Quand l’islam fait école. 21 October. 
 
Le Tourneau, D 1997, La laïcité à l’épreuve de l’Islam: le cas du port du ‘foulard islamique’ 
dans l’école publique en France, Revue générale de Droit. 
 
Seignoret, C 1989, ‘C’est juste un foulard,’ La Croix, 25 October. 
 
The Guardian 2004, ‘France steps closer to Muslim headscarf ban’, 30 January. 
 
Tincq, H 1994, De l’autre côté du voile, Le Monde, 30 November. 
 
Walter, N 2004, ‘When the veil means freedom’, The Guardian, 20 January. 
 
Waxman, S 1995, ‘War of Nerves’, Chicago Tribune, 3 February. 
 
 
 
